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Abstract This paper uses the eruption of the Icelandic 
volcano Eyjafjallajökull in April and May 2010 as a case study 
of disruption to civil aviation by airborne ash, with emphasis on 
risk management aspects. Severe curtailment of flights over 
much of Europe took place during the crisis, which lasted for 
slightly more than one week. More than 8.5 million passen-
gers were stranded and commerce was profoundly affected. 
The United Kingdom was one of the worst impacted countries 
and took the lead in managing the crisis. The paper considers 
elements of the decision-making process that formed the 
basis of the UK Government’s emergency response. It exam-
ines the relations between science, governance, and economi c 
imperatives. Physical thresholds guiding decisions to restrict 
airspace were defined somewhat arbitrarily, which may have 
increased disruption. A damaging form of risk aversion pre-
vailed at certain points in the crisis. Lack of preexisting proce-
dures and planning meant that the response to dynamically 
changing meteorological conditions had to be improvised. At 
the same time, lack of integration between different modes in 
the European transportation system meant that had the crisis 
continued any longer there would have been severe problems 
in moving stranded people and commodities, as well as soar-
ing economic losses. Eruptions similar to or more serious than 
that of Eyjafjallajökull are perfectly possible in Europe in the 
not-too-distant future.
Keywords Volcanic ash emergency, international civil 
aviation, crisis management, Europe, air transportation
1 Introduction
Worldwide there are some 1500 potentially active volcanoes, 
of which perhaps 50–70 erupt in any year (Siebert, Simkin, 
and Kimberly 2010). Not all eruptions are violent, as the 
nature of volcanic activity varies from relatively gentle out-
pourings of lava (effusive eruptions) to cataclysmic explosive 
events, termed ultra-Plinian eruptions (Sigurdsson 1999). 
However, even relatively mild forms of explosive eruption 
can inject particulate ash into the upper troposphere and lowe r 
stratosphere (Jakosky 1986). The smaller particles—glassy 
silicates and aerosols—can remain suspended for days, weeks, 
or even years, and will drift with weather patterns and the 
prevailing directions of the general atmospheric circulation. 
If the concentration is sufficient, the ash may be a hazard to 
both aircraft in flight and airport operations on the ground.
Much has been written about the volcanology and meteor-
ology associated with explosive eruptions and ash clouds 
(Leadbetter and Hort 2009). There is also a discrete literature 
on the nature of the hazard to jet aircraft and the whole system 
of civil aviation (Casadevall 1994a). Relatively little has been 
written about the organizational, logistical, risk management, 
and decision-making processes associated with volcanic 
ash emergencies for aviation (Casadevall and Krohn 1995; 
Guffanti, Casadevall, and Budding 2010). The eruption 
of Eyjafjallajökull (pronounced “A-ya-fyat-la-yœk-utl”) in 
Iceland in April 2010 provides a good opportunity to assess 
these aspects of such a contingency, and one that has not been 
extensively studied from this point of view. The crisis in 
the European transportation system that resulted from the 
collective decision by European air traffic control authorities 
to suspend commercial flights lasted hardly more than one 
week. Yet large numbers of people were affected and disrup-
tion during that time was severe—more so, in fact, than that 
caused by the “groundstop” imposed after the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 in the United States (Mazzocchi, 
Hansstein, and Ragona 2010). The economic costs were 
high and so was the level of uncertainty among the travelling 
public (including the present author). It is clear from the 
volcanological evidence that a larger eruption that injects far 
greater quantities of ash into the atmosphere for much longer 
periods is perfectly possible, with much more profound 
implications for travel in a continent as densely inhabited and 
as interdependent as Europe.
The purpose of this paper is to use the eruption of Eyjafjal-
lajökull as a case study and derive some general lessons 
for crisis management from this example. I will begin by 
summarizing the nature of the hazard and risk. Next, I will 
consider the impact upon aviation and travel of the Icelandic 
eruption in April 2010. Then, I will examine some of the 
implications for crisis management and identify some lessons 
to be learned from this example.
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2 Volcanic Ash Hazard to Civil Aviation
This account is restricted to civil aviation and jet aircraft. 
Hazards to military fighter planes, turbo-prop aircraft and 
helicopters are regarded as a separate issue and are not 
considered here.i In the case of Eyjafjallajökull, the most 
widespread risk was to the jet engines of commercial airlin-
ers. Airborne distributions of fine volcanic ash are not easily 
detectable by on-board weather radar. Whether they can be 
detected by ground-based and satellite means depends on the 
size and concentration of particulates. Other forms of remote 
sensing, such as LIDAR, may help atmospheric scientists to 
estimate the size, position, and ash concentration of plumes 
(Ajtai et al. 2010). A silicic volcano can inject ash into 
the stratosphere within five minutes of the start of a highly 
explosive eruption. Coupled with the dynamism of the earth’s 
atmosphere, this leads to a mobile and rapidly changing 
hazard situation: ash is first concentrated and then dispersed 
in suspension at particular altitudes, typically between 7000 
and 20,000 meters above sea level.
The risks to a commercial airliner stem from several 
source s and are well summarized by Miller and Casadevall 
(2000). First, air quality in the cockpit and cabin may be com-
promised by the intake of ash. Secondly, instrumentation may 
be damaged. This includes potential blockage of the Pitot 
tubes that measure speed in flight. The aircraft could stall if 
this information cannot be relayed to pilots (as occurred in the 
fatal crash of Air France flight 447 on 1 June 2009, when ice 
obstructed the Pitot tubes). Thirdly, forward surfaces, includ-
ing the windshield, can be abraded by ash. Abrasion can also 
erode the compressor blades in the jet engines and thus reduce 
their performance. Finally, and perhaps most seriously, as 
jet engines operate at temperatures that are higher than the 
melting point of silica, ash can fuse onto surfaces within the 
engine, especially turbine vanes and parts of the combustion 
chamber. This can cause engines to flame-out and stall through 
loss of compression, although, as the aircraft descends, 
higher atmospheric pressures may allow an engine to be 
restarted.
According to international statistics, from 1935 until 2003 
some 102 aircraft encountered atmospheric concentrations of 
volcanic ash that were dense enough to constitute a hazard to 
flight (ICAO 2007). The U.S. Geological Survey has formu-
lated a scale to describe the severity of encounter in terms of 
the impact on the flying aircraft (see Table 1).
To date, no encounters of level five have occurred, 
although there have been several of level four. Two of these 
are particularly well-known. In the first case, on 24 June 
1982, British Airways flight 9 from London to Auckland 
(Boeing 747-236B, registration no. G-BDXH) cruising at 
11,000 meters, entered an ash cloud emanating from Indone-
sia’s Galunggung volcano (Witham et al. 2012). All four 
engines surged and flamed out, whereupon the aircraft glided 
for 12 minutes and descended 7000 meters. The engines were 
then restarted, but one of them failed again at 4000 meters. 
The aircraft nevertheless managed to land safely at Jakarta 
Airport, but as windshield abrasion had reduced the pilots’ 
visibility almost to zero, it could not taxi off the runway. 
Moreover, smoke and dust were concentrated in the cabin and 
represented a health hazard to its occupants.
In the second instance, KLM flight 867 from Amsterdam 
to Tokyo (operated by Boeing 747-406 registration no. 
PH-BFC) flew into the ash cloud of Redoubt Volcano, Alaska. 
As the aircraft climbed to escape the cloud all four engines 
and the back-up electrical system failed. Battery power had 
to be used to restart the engines, and as this took numerous 
attempts, avionics and flight control systems were left with-
out power. Two engines were restarted at 4000 meters and 
the remaining two at 3350 meters. Damage amounted to USD 
80 million and all four engines were written off, although 
the aircraft continued to fly after major repairs (Casadevall 
1994b).
These two incidents were widely discussed in the mass 
media at the time of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption (BBC News 
2010). It is an open question how relevant these engine failure 
events were to the crisis in April 2010. Rather than cata-
strophic failure of engines in flight, there was a greater risk 
of abrasion damage to windshields and outer skins, and to 
turbine rotor blades and other engine components. The prob-
able extent of this would depend on the configuration of ash 
clouds in relation to the pattern and frequency of flights.
Nonetheless, although the area around Eyjafjallajökull 
was interdicted to civil aviation, nowhere else had particu-
larly dense concentrations of airborne ash. Paradoxically, 
Reykjavik International Airport (at Keflavik, west of 
Eyjafjallajökull) was not one of the most affected in Europe, 
as westerly winds blew the ash cloud away from it. For 
the rest of Europe there remained the question of when ash 
concentration was too great for safe flight. Despite various 
symposia and the publication of manuals on volcanic ash 
hazards to aviation (ICAO 2007), the answer was not known 
at the time (Brooker 2010). Moreover, this kind of hazard 
did not appear in the British Government’s recently published 
national risk register (UK Cabinet Office 2010).
Table 1. Severity of encounter
Class Description
0 Acrid odor, electrostatic discharge
1 Light cabin dust, EGT fluctuations
2 Heavy cabin dust, external and internal abrasion damage, window 
frosting
3 Engine vibration, erroneous instrument readings, hydraulic-fluid 
contamination, damage to engine and electrical system
4 Engine failure requiring in-flight restart
5 Engine failure or other damage leading to crash
Source: Adapted from Guffanti, Casadevall, and Budding (2010).
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Table 2. Chronology of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption crisis
Wednesday, 14 April 2010 (Day 0)
$  28,087 flights take place in Europe (1.3 percent more than the 
previous Wednesday)
$  Eyjafjallajokull begins to erupt at 07:00 hrs Central European Time 
(CET) and the first advisory is issued at 10:13 hrs
$  Norway and Scotland restrict air space, Sweden and Finland do so 
from midnight
Thursday, 15 April 2010 (Day 1)
$ 20,842 flights take place in Europe (a 27.1 percent decrease)
$  airspace closures gradually affect almost the whole United Kingdom
$  airspace closed in Denmark and Ireland, and from 15:00 CET in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and southern Sweden
$ additional regulations applied in Sweden and Norway
Friday, 16 April 2010 (Day 2)
$ 11,659 flights take place in Europe (a 59.2 percent decrease)
$  airspace closes in Germany and eastern and southern European 
countries
Saturday, 17 April 2010 (Day 3)
$ 5335 flights take place in Europe (a 76.5 percent decrease)
$  airspace closures spread across Estonia, Poland, Switzerland, the 
Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, France, 
Germany, and northern Italy
$  plans to reopen parts of UK, Dutch, and German airspace do not prove 
feasible
Sunday, 18 April 2010 (Day 4)
$ 5204 flights take place in Europe (a 79.2 percent decrease)
$  at 16:00 CET airspace is open above 6000 meters in the Bremen, 
Maastricht, and Rhein areas and in Austria, France, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, and Switzerland
Monday, 19 April 2010 (Day 5)
$ 9330 flights take place in Europe (a 66.8 percent decrease)
$  some flight sectors open in Germany, France, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Spain, Bulgaria, and 
Austria
Tuesday, 20 April 2010 (Day 6)
$ 13,101 flights take place in Europe (a 52.4 percent decrease)
$ new Eurocontrol procedures enter into force at 06:00 CET
$  most airspace is reopened except the UK, which reopens at 20:00 CET
Wednesday, 21 April 2010 (Day 7)
$ 21,916 flights take place in Europe (a 22.0 percent decrease)
$  by 09:30 hrs CET most European airspace opens except in parts of 
northern Scotland, Sweden, Finland, and northwest France
Thursday, 22 April 2010 (Day 8)
$ 27,284 flights take place in Europe (a 4.5 percent decrease)
$  the aviation emergency concludes, pending any further developments 
of the eruption
Source: Eurocontrol (2010).
3 The Eyjafjallajökull Eruption of 
April–May 2010
In the week 14–21 April 2010, 313 airports were closed in 
Europe, representing three quarters of the aviation network 
(Table 2). At the peak of the crisis, more than 75 percent of 
flights were cancelled (in total 108,000 throughout the week, 
or 48 percent of European air traffic—see Figure 1). The clo-
sures affected 10.5 million passengers, 8.6 million of whom 
were temporarily stranded. Economic damage resulting 
from inability to move passengers and goods amounted to 
somewhere between 1.7 and 3.3 billion euros (Mazzocchi, 
Hansstein, and Ragona 2010). So large was the socioeconomi c 
impact that it prompts one to ask whether the decision-
making processes that partly created it were appropriate and 
justified. However, first the event must be described.
Eyjafjallajökull, situated in the far south of Iceland, is not 
one of that country’s most dangerous volcanoes. Neverthe-
less, it began to show signs of activity in December 2009 and 
suffered a flank eruption in March 2010. Explosive phre-
atomagmatic activity from the central vent began on 14 April 
2010 and continued, sporadically, until 22 May (Figure 2). 
During the early days a 9 km-high plume of ash was emitted 
from the central vent. The emission of ash was sufficient to 
provoke a six-day closure of northern and central European 
air-space over the period 15–20 April, as well as further 
partial closures in May. Yet, in volcanological terms, this was 
not a large eruption: it reached VEI=4 on the volcanic explo-
sivity index, which involved the emission of about 1 km3 of 
magma-equivalent (Newhall and Self 1982). In comparison, 
the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia (VEI=7), the 
largest volcanic event in the last two centuries, emitted more 
than 100 km3. The last eruption of Eyjafjallajökull before 
2010 lasted from December 1821 until January 1823, includ-
ing 25 days of continuously heavy ash emissions. One can 
hardly begin to imagine what 13 months without air travel in 
Europe would be like. Moreover, other Icelandic volcanoes 
(notably Katla, Hekla, and Krafla) have a higher eruption 
potential than Eyjafjallajökull (Sammonds, McGuire, and 
Edwards 2010).
Experience from around the world clearly indicates that 
volcanic eruptions function according to geological rules, not 
human dictates. This means that the timing of events can 
be unpredictable, despite an increasingly precise ability to 
monitor fluxes of heat and gases, deformation of the ground, 
and volcano seismicity. It also means that the sequence of an 
eruption can be prolonged and irregular. Mount Vesuvius in 
southern Italy erupted continually from 1631 to 1904, with 
never more than seven years’ interval between emissions. 
Hence the onset and duration of an eruption may be difficult 
to foresee in any way that can benefit emergency managemen t.
The upshot of this is that authorities may have to devise 
solutions to problems caused by natural events whose begin-
ning, evolution, and ending are uncertain and at best only 
partly predictable. This requires a high degree of flexibility 
and ingenuity, as well as clear and well-conceived rules about 
the conditions under which flights can take place. The prob-
lem with Eyjafjallajökull was that the rules were worked out, 
with significant and perhaps arbitrary changes, in an ad hoc 
manner during the course of the emergency.
4 Consequences of the Eruption
Airspace closures began at midday on Thursday 15 April 
2010. They were accompanied by the progressive closure of 
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more and more airports. The United Kingdom took the lead 
in this process, informed by the London branch of the Inter-
national Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW—Romero 2004), 
which liaised with the UK’s National Air Traffic Control 
Service (NATS). Other countries in northern and central 
Europe soon followed suit. By 17 April airports were closed 
as far south as Rome and as far east as Moscow. In Europe 
only certain Iberian airports escaped closure. It was 22 April 
before normal service was—partially and tentatively—
resumed, by which time an enormous backlog of stranded 
passengers had built up. In the worst cases, it took up to three 
weeks to accommodate some of the people who needed to fly 
from parts of Asia and South America to Europe. It has been 
suggested (The Guardian 2010) that this was the result of 
airlines’ restriction of the availability of seats to stranded 
long-haul passengers. If that is so, it reflects the airlines’ 
desire to sell more seats and make up for the deficit caused by 
the interruption of business.
In all 108,000 flights were cancelled, lost revenues 
amounted to USD 1.7 billion and 10.5 million passengers had 
their travel plans disrupted (Budd et al. 2011). The economic 
consequences for business included not only reduced passen-
ger receipts, but also blockage of the movement of goods. 
More than one fifth of the economy of Kenya consists of 
exporting flowers to Europe, and that trade ceased for the 
duration of the flight ban. As a result, more than one million 
roses had to be destroyed. Other consequences included life-
threatening delays in the importation of bone marrow from 
donors in North America to patients waiting for transplants in 
Europe. In this respect, the Eyjafjallajökull crisis calls to 
mind the unanticipated consequences of the terrorist attacks 
on the United States on 11 September 2001: for example, the 
small town of Gander, Newfoundland, suddenly had to spend 
a week caring for the occupants of 36 wide-bodied passenger 
aircraft that had been forced to land there when the U.S. 
aviation authorities imposed a blanket “groundstop” (Scanlon 
2003).
As expected, many of the stranded passengers turned to 
other forms of transport to get home from holidays and 
business trips, in some cases with surprising ingenuity and 
versatility (Jensen 2011). This put considerable strain on the 
European train and ferry network. Hotel prices in some of the 
major continental cities soared, while in other places hotels 
were unusually empty. Particular problems were experienced 
by people, such as students, whose economic means were 
limited and who found themselves unable to afford accom-
modation, yet they were not supported by the air carriers from 
Figure 1. Flight cancellations in Europe over the period 
14–22 April 2010 compared with normal levels of air traffic
Source: Eurocontrol (2010).
Figure 2. Eyjafjallajökull in eruption, April 2010
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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whom they had purchased tickets. It was thus common to 
find such people sleeping in airport terminals, which were 
otherwise devoid of passengers and personnel. Meanwhile 
serious overcrowding occurred at railway stations and on 
long-distance trains. Most stranded passengers experienced 
substantial delays and had to pay significant additional costs 
to reach their destinations. The prices of ground travel—for 
example, on the cross-Channel Eurostar trains—rose to meet 
the vastly increased demand, but capacity remained relatively 
inflexible, and quite inadequate.
European Commission regulation 261/2004 came into 
force in February 2005 and is designed to guarantee air 
passengers’ rights in the event that they are unable to travel 
for any reason that is out of their control, such as overbooking 
or cancellation of a flight (European Union 2004). It was 
obviously intended to counter commercial arbitrariness and 
exploitation of passengers by the airlines, and it was immedi-
ately opposed by IATA and the European Low-Fare Airlines 
Association (ELFAA). During the Eyjafjallajökull crisis, 
the guaranteed right to compensation and material assistance 
was vigorously contested, especially by the low-cost carrier 
RyanAir, whose CEO, Michael Ryan, did not see why a pas-
senger who had paid very little for a flight should be substan-
tially compensated when it had to be cancelled for reasons 
that were beyond the control of the airline. The legislation 
was clearly not framed in the light of a major natural event 
and ELFAA members felt that, while it might be reasonable 
in the case of single cancellations, it imposed an unfair burden 
on them during a major and prolonged European crisis. 
Because a natural calamity was beyond their ability to con-
trol, airlines maintained that no liability could be established. 
However, the real matter at stake was the question of who 
bears the risks associated with not being able to travel as 
expected. Nonetheless, the European Commission refused to 
back down, arguing that if airlines carried passengers they 
had a responsibility not to abandon them. RyanAir attempted 
to test the Commission’s resolve by not paying out and was 
duly fined. In fact, in a series of rulings issued between March 
2012 and January 2013, the European Court of Justice 
confirmed the company’s obligation to compensate stranded 
passengers, some of whom had sued (The Guardian 2013; 
European Court of Justice 2013).
5 Official Responses to the Eruption
In 1947 the Icelandic volcano Hekla erupted with a larger 
emission of airborne ash than the 2010 event at Eyjafjal-
lajökull. Since then civil aviation has grown enormously in 
scope and importance to daily life. By 2007, when the fourth 
international conference on volcanic ash hazards was held 
in New Zealand, it was recognized that improvements in 
remote sensing enable ash clouds to be tracked more precisel y. 
Despite such innovation, knowledge of ash clouds poses 
operational questions for civil aviation that, if not resolved 
satisfactorily, could lead to high losses of revenue without 
corresponding benefits of safety when air travel is shut down. 
One thing which is not in doubt is that in April 2010 volcanic 
ash hazards to air transportation had been well known for 
decades (Scarone 1987).
I now focus on decision making in the United Kingdom, 
which was the country that took the lead in air transportation 
management during the crisis, no doubt because of its relative 
proximity in the North Sea to Iceland and thus its location in 
the path of the ash cloud. The main question to answer is 
whether the UK response, and the subsequent response in the 
rest of Europe, were justified by the risks or whether the 
response should have been different? In other words, should 
commercial flying amid suspended particulates of volcanic 
ash be avoided at all costs, or is there a reliably detectable 
level at which the risks of damage or equipment failure in 
flight for any given periods of time are insignificant? Further-
more, if the latter case prevails, what is the safe threshold 
level of ash concentration in the atmosphere? Finally, what 
are the consequences if air transportation shuts down and 
what alternative strategies can be used to mitigate them?
The London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (LVAAC) was 
set up in the 1990s by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). At midday on Thursday 15 April 
2010 the UK National Air Traffic Control Service (NATS) 
responded to a warning notice from LVAAC by banning all 
non-emergency traffic in UK airspace. It is important to note 
that identification of the distribution and concentration of sus-
pended ash particulates requires a combination of methods, 
including satellite remote sensing with LIDAR, ceilometers 
and ground-based sun photometers (Krotkov et al. 2010; 
Flentje et al. 2010). The results may be solid scientifically, but 
they are somewhat equivocal about the effects on jet aircraft. 
The LVAAC issued maps that offered no data on concentra-
tion levels, other than defining the edges of the cloud by the 
200 μg m−3 isopach. The LVAAC was slow to utilize the U.S. 
Geological Survey’s color coded warning (Casadevall 1994a), 
which is a standard form of reference for American volcano-
logical observatories when they need to communicate with 
civil aviation and meteorological authorities (Albersheim and 
Guffanti 2009).
The British government entered the crisis with no reliable 
data on ash concentrations in the European atmosphere and 
none on levels at which it was safe to fly. The result was a 
form of risk aversion, which prevailed until better informa-
tion was made available. Initially, flights were banned in 
areas delimited as being covered by the ash cloud (at least 
200 μg m−3). By 20 April, the threshold had been raised by 
one order of magnitude to 2000 μg m−3. It appears that very 
serious damage to jet engines begins at concentrations 
approaching three orders of magnitude higher—2 g m−3. 
Around the 2000 μg m−3 level an “enhanced procedures” 
zone was established where limited flying could take place, 
buffered with a 60 nautical mile (approximately 111 km) 
interdiction zone. The latter was abolished on 11 May, when 
a form of “enhanced procedures” zone was introduced that 
allowed short flights in the area bounded by the 2000 and 
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4000 μg m−3 isolines. Despite its possible arbitrariness in 
terms of air operations, this distinction was later institutional-
ized in the ICAO volcanic ash contingency plan, a post hoc 
set of general procedures for assessing and dealing with the 
risks posed by eruptions to aviation (ICAO 2010b). The plan 
followed ICAO task force meetings in Montréal in July 2010 
in which it was noted that ash concentration thresholds had 
never been established before Eyjafjallajökull, but that 
further research was needed in order to establish how valid 
the proposed ones actually are (ICAO 2010a). This, of course, 
is risk management without adequate knowledge of vulnera-
bility and risk—and potentially on a continental scale!
The British Government’s penchant for risk aversion was 
amply demonstrated in a previous case, that of the Hatfield 
train crash of 17 October 2000. This high-speed rail accident 
killed four people and resulted from a broken rail, or techni-
cally “rolling contact fatigue” leading to “gauge corner 
cracking.” Railtrack, the British rail engineering company, 
immediately imposed 1200 speed restrictions of 30 km hr−1 
on the national network and allowed them to persist for 
months until full inspections had been carried out all over the 
country. The result was a slow-down in trains that led to 
the virtual forced abandonment of the national timetable. The 
disruption was extreme and prolonged, and Railtrack was 
eventually declared bankrupt. Many observers questioned 
whether such a cautious approach was necessary: it led to 
highly expensive disruption, but not necessarily to great 
improvements in safety (Jack 2001).
The dynamics of atmospheric circulation could cause rela-
tively large changes in the pattern of ash concentration in only 
a few hours. Hence the concept of “safe corridors”—widely 
discussed during the Eyjafjallajökull crisis—is called into 
question. This involves connecting departure and destination 
airports with flight paths that are free of significant hazard. 
Unfortunately, if an abrupt change in weather patterns should 
occur, one can envisage a corridor being closed while it is 
being used.
There were several questionable aspects of the United 
Kingdom’s strategy for managing the crisis. First, as volcanic 
ash aviation emergencies do not appear in the 2010 edition of 
the National Risk Register (UK Cabinet Office 2010), there 
was no anticipation of the needs posed by the emergency, and 
thus the response was purely reactive. The UK’s emergency 
management system is based on a command and control 
model in which “gold,” “silver,” and “bronze” correspond 
respectively to strategic, tactical, and operational commands 
(Arbuthnot 2008). The top of the pyramid is represented by 
“platinum,” sometimes known as “diamond,” which in effect 
is the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBRA), the national 
policy and strategy committee under the nominal leadership 
of the Prime Minister. COBRA first met at 08:30 hrs on 
Monday 19 April, almost four days after the start of the crisis. 
Notwithstanding anything that may have gone on behind the 
scenes, this showed a lack of visible leadership at a time when 
travellers, airlines, and other interested parties were perplexed 
about the situation and unable to see a way forward.
This passive “wait and see” approach was not greatly 
appreciated by the public. It was mirrored by Eurocontrol, the 
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, 
which did not move towards a harmonized approach until 
impelled to do so by the European Commission at a meeting 
held on 19 April, well into the crisis (Brannigan 2010). Until 
that point, and to a lesser extent afterwards, the response was 
characterized by nations that took the initiative in making 
decisions and other countries that followed them, prompting 
one expert on risk regulation to comment that “EU integration 
does not yet extend to air traffic management” (Alemanno 
2010). The situation was somewhat corrected in the publica-
tion eight months later by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization of the regional volcanic ash contingency plan 
(ICAO 2010b). This document specifies unsafe levels of 
atmospheric ash concentration, using the thresholds that 
were employed at the end of the April 2010 crisis, and defines 
the conditions for issuing bulletins to aviation personnel, 
including pilots. But the ICAO does not define or apportion 
the responsibilities for declaring interdiction zones for civil 
aviation in Europe.
Secondly, there was an initial failure to realize that detailed 
information on ash concentrations was needed. The cloud did 
not constitute a uniform hazard to aviation. The thresholds 
selected (200 and 2000 μg m−3) did not have an adequate jus-
tification in terms of science or flight engineering. After more 
than 10 years of development of high-resolution Lagrangian 
convection-diffusion models, the UK Meteorological Office 
supplied ash-cloud monitoring and prediction data using its 
Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment 
(NAME III) digital model (Jones et al. 2007), the original 
version of which was developed to track the diffusion of 
radionuclide pollution from Chernobyl. This was criticized as 
inappropriate (Sammonds, McGuire, and Edwards 2010, 10), 
but there were few alternatives. At the same time, agreements 
had been reached with aircraft engineers and the manufactur-
ers of jet engines on safe concentrations. It was not until the 
week after the crisis started that experimental flying began for 
the purposes of collecting ash concentration data in airborne 
filters and testing the effects of particular concentrations 
on jet engines and the aircraft on which they were mounted. 
The experiments involved a research aircraft that flew from 
Cranfield University Airport in Bedfordshire, England, to 
Glasgow and back on 20 April. It was followed by a British 
Airways Boeing 747 that flew from Bristol to Scotland and 
back, largely as a provocation to the British Government, as 
British Airways was concerned about its losses. Similar pres-
sure to lift the ban had already come from German airlines 
Lufthansa and Air Berlin. The results of the flight tests were 
encouraging enough for interdictions on flights progressively 
to be rescinded.
It is clear from this description that some of the fundamen-
tal ingredients of the decision-making process could only be 
acquired during the crisis. These included meteorological and 
ash concentration data. Others should have been available 
before it happened. They included information on safe levels 
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of tolerance of suspended volcanic ash particulates for air-
craft skins, jet engines, avionics, instrumentation, and cabin 
air quality. Finally, no procedure was in place to make the 
relevant decisions. The result was managerial improvisation 
when it was least warranted. This constituted a precautionary 
approach that bordered on risk aversion and had little 
scientific or engineering justification.
6 Pan-European Approaches and 
Problems
Eurocontrol, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, is a civil agency with 39 member states. It is not 
an organ of the European Union with which it collaborates 
closely. Its aim is to achieve greater interoperability and 
efficiency together with better safety management in Europea n 
aviation. But the lengthy 2006 Eurocontrol report on risk 
management (Eurocontrol 2006) makes no mention of volca-
nic eruptions or other natural hazards (neither does the 2010 
edition of the UK Government’s risk register). It concentrates 
entirely on general accident prevention measures. Eurocon-
trol cannot override national air transportation management 
or policy. Nor can it countermand European Union initiatives. 
With regard to these, the disruption caused by the ash cloud 
led to an acceleration of the EU’s Single European Sky initia-
tive, which is designed to coordinate the management and 
regulation of airspace across Europe (Schubert 2003). In fact, 
the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research 
program (SESAR) is being progressively implemented 
by Eurocontrol members. SESAR’s aim is to improve safety, 
efficiency, and interoperability by introducing a uniform 
system to what were previously disparate initiatives by the 
various national air traffic management agencies (Graham 
and Young 2006). This is taking place in the context of the 
development of the European Common Aviation Area, in 
which 27 EU countries and nine other nations had signed an 
agreement to guarantee common aviation services (Schubert 
2003).
There are many organizations and initiatives that have a 
stake in managing access to the European skies. Thus the 
regulatory situation is complex and has many possible conse-
quences, not all of which are immediately clear (Button 1996). 
For example, liberalization and efforts to promote greater 
interconnectedness have undoubtedly increased the range of 
options for Europe’s travellers. However, national air space 
remains sovereign: it can be coordinated by supranational 
bodies, but these cannot countermand national decisions. 
Moreover, increased competition has led to crowded skies 
and service providers that operate on small profit margins 
(Nippani and Washer 2011). The result is a curious mixture of 
fragmentation and integration (Alemanno 2010). It is of note 
that none of the international programs seeks to integrate air 
travel with other forms of transportation, which are assumed 
to be in competition with civil aviation. Opportunities for a 
fully integrated response to emergency logistics are thus quite 
limited.
7 Logistical Aspects of the Crisis
Apart from deciding whether it was safe to fly or not, deci-
sions needed to be made that ensured other forms of transpor-
tation were available in substitution. Seven million people 
were stranded across Europe and pressure on trains, buses, 
coaches, taxis, and vehicle hire was intense. While some 
places had spare hotel capacity (London, for instance), others 
(such as Paris) rapidly developed acute shortages of accom-
modation. Pricing was left to the operators to regulate, and 
many of them instantly perceived an opportunity to profit by 
the crisis.
When it appeared that flights might not resume for some 
time, COBRA began to make plans for mass transportation. 
This would have involved collecting passengers at a hub air-
port which remained open, such as Madrid, conveying them 
by road to the port of Santander, and putting them on naval 
ships. This strategy was actually carried out for members of 
the UK armed forces returning from duty in Afghanistan. It 
was tacitly agreed that spare capacity on HMS Albion would 
be given to civilians in need, although for fear of stimulating 
greater demand than could be accommodated, that was not 
widely stated to the public. Had the crisis continued for much 
longer, there would have been a need for significantly greater 
intervention of this kind. People returning to Europe by 
air from the Americas would have had to land in Spain and 
proceed by land or sea. The concept of sea travel was sound, 
since it would have helped alleviate congestion on Europe’s 
railway network. But it had some drawbacks. Most countries 
looked after their own nationals abroad through their interna-
tional diplomatic representation. Emphasis was placed on 
getting people back to their countries of origin. As any expat 
knows, not all essential travel involves return to one’s country 
of citizenship. At a time of severe rationing of places on 
means of transport, certain groups of people might not receive 
help.
The travellers’ tales that came out of the crisis highlighted 
the fact that there is precious little integration between modes 
of transport in Europe. That is especially true in terms of crisis 
response. The disappearance of air traffic did not mean that 
other modes of transportation (ferry, coach, rail, etc.) could 
combine efficiently to take up the excess demand. This was 
especially problematic for long-distance travel, which, with-
out aircraft, required a greater than normal combination of 
modes. The root of the problem lies in the question of sover-
eignty versus federalism in Europe. Policy and operational 
decision-making for air traffic and other forms of transporta-
tion occur at the national level, which is logical in terms of 
sovereignty but may complicate matters for international 
travel, which requires a harmonized approach. What is clear 
is that Europe badly needs crisis response strategies and plans 
that provide for substitution if one mode of international 
transport fails. Such plans should maintain affordable prices 
at the same time as they enhance both the capacity and the 
efficiency of mass transportation over long distances and 
across national boundaries.
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As with so many other forms of emergency planning, so 
with volcanic ash and civil aviation, it is necessary to con-
sider the secondary and collateral effects that must be dealt 
with. For example, for some types of commerce, face-to-face 
meetings can be substituted by video conferencing and other 
kinds of electronic networking. Other forms need careful 
evaluation of alternatives and development of contingency 
plans. Special attention needs to be given to what to do about 
flying for emergency purposes. If rescue missions cannot be 
flown, or essential medical supplies cannot be air-freighted, 
what are the alternatives in terms of guaranteed priority 
delivery of the service in question?
8 Discussion
An influential report by University College London’s 
Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction concluded as 
follows:
The ban on flights not only meant increased risks for all those 
travelling by other means; it also threatened the livelihood 
of whole economies. Once the appealing simplicity of the 
precautionary approach breaks down, an array of difficult 
questions arises, including: which risks (and which benefits) 
ought to be taken into account? Who is to articulate the values 
(beyond safety) that ought to be addressed when managing 
risks? (Sammonds, McGuire, and Edwards 2010, 14)
It also commented that:
The havoc arising from the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull has 
been presented in many circles as being a consequence of the 
event being both unprecedented and unexpected—neither is 
the case. (Sammonds, McGuire, and Edwards 2010, 8)
Part of the report comprised a detailed critique of the use 
of the ALARP (as low as reasonably possible) risk manage-
ment approach (Melchers 2001). Initially, this made use of 
the two thresholds, 200 and 2000 μg m−3, as representative 
of broadly tolerable and unacceptable risk levels. In reality, 
neither value had a scientific or operational basis; hence both 
were entirely arbitrary foundations of decisions that had 
widespread socioeconomic repercussions. Regarding the 
economic impact of the crisis, Nippani and Washer (2011) 
found that investment in European airline stocks fell as a 
result of the eruption. Paradoxically, Mazzocchi, Hansstein, 
and Ragona (2010) estimated that the financial losses to the 
airlines caused by the first week of the emergency were insig-
nificant, but in contrast after one month the cumulative effect 
was enormous—in fact, they estimated it to be 3.3 billion 
euros for nine European flag carriers, about twice some of the 
initial projections for the entire civil aviation industry. This 
reflected the effect of uncertainties and recurrent obstacles to 
flying and suggests that a longer drawn-out eruption scenario 
could very easily send companies rapidly into bankruptcy.
Prudent emergency management is necessary in order 
to avoid losses wherever that is possible. It is a question 
of finding equilibrium between three essential ingredients: 
procedures and protocols, plans and planning, and improvisa-
tion (Alexander 2002). Inefficiency is manifest by excesses of 
improvisation when what is being improvised could—and 
should—have been foreseen and decided upon in advance. 
The British Government’s passive and reactive approach 
to the Eyjafjallajökull crisis betokened improvisation and 
reaction, rather than foresight and prior planning. Regardless 
of whether politicians, civil servants, emergency managers or 
scientists were to blame, the country was not ready to tackle 
a foreseeable emergency, which took it entirely by surprise. 
Given the large amount of information that was available 
at the time in the atmospheric and earth sciences, and the 
increasing sophistication of volcanological and meteorologi-
cal remote sensing monitoring processes, this lapse is not 
entirely comprehensible and one hopes that it will not be 
repeated.
Further investigation is needed with regard to the processe s 
of international decision making. Through ICAO and the 
International Airways Volcano Watch, there are potent mech-
anisms for information sharing between European nations. 
However, the vast majority of the data inform decision 
making at the national rather than the continental level (ICAO 
2010a, 2010b). Countries do tend to follow suit when one 
of them takes the lead (in April 2010 it was the United 
Kingdom). Still the response to Eyjafjallajökull was nonethe-
less fragmentary and it did little to coordinate movement 
through the European transportation network. With low-cost 
airlines and the gradual development of a continental high-
speed rail network, international travel is becoming ever more 
common and popular. It demands a comprehensive process 
of emergency planning, and one that facilitates modal switch 
by being able to manage emergency capacity at the trans-
national level, as noted in a recent document from the 
European Commission (2010, 7).
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the 
United States, the popularity of flying plummeted among the 
general public, which took to the roads. For more than two 
years the number of road accident casualties was higher than 
normal, while during the same period there were no fatalities 
as a result of commercial aviation (Gigerenzer 2006). This 
reminds one that a risk analysis for cessation of flights should 
also take into consideration the possibility of risk transfer, 
which needs to be weighed against the risks of allowing 
flights to take place. The methodology should also bear in 
mind that people do not necessarily see each death as being 
equal, as there may be greater tolerance for mortality on the 
roads than for deaths in civil aviation (Viscusi 2010).
The management of volcanic emergencies requires careful 
and detailed use of scenarios. In this context a scenario can 
be defined as the projection into the future of possible alterna-
tive sequences of events in order to plan flexible responses 
(Schoemaker 1993). Properly used, scenarios can constrain 
uncertainty and increase confidence in projections. The sce-
nario for ash-cloud interruptions for civil aviation should take 
account of transportation problems, interruption of business 
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activities, possible cessation of essential activities (especially 
in the medical field), and risks of bankruptcy in key sectors 
of the economy. The economic, social, and logistical conse-
quences need to be estimated for differing durations of the 
emergency and strategies to reduce impacts should be put 
forward. Although difficult, this is not impossible.
In this paper the April 2010 Eyjafjallajökull volcanic 
emergency has been considered through a retrospective eval-
uation. It is by no means unique and could easily be repeated, 
potentially on a more spectacular scale. One may expect 
an explosive eruption from Iceland on average every five to 
seven years (Sammonds, McGuire, and Edwards 2010). 
Twenty eruptions in historic time have been between one and 
two orders of magnitude larger than the Eyjafjallajökull 2010 
event, with eruption columns two to three times higher. 
In recompense, the north-westerly wind patterns that would 
blow ash across Europe occur perhaps only six percent of the 
time. Volcanic emergencies can involve long sequences of 
activity. For example, in the Caribbean, Montserrat began its 
present eruptive cycle in 1995 and is still not quiescent, 
necessitating the semi-permanent evacuation of some of the 
islanders. Prolonged uncertainty is the enemy of strategic and 
tactical decision-making, but at least it can be constrained 
by the use of scenarios. A further remedy is to have flexible 
procedures and broad, all-embracing plans that are prepared 
before any such emergency with a clear idea of some of the 
options that might have to be faced when it happens. Three 
examples are how to sustain the Kenyan flower-growing 
industry, on which European florists are so dependent (or, 
much better, how to avoid such an intercontinental depen-
dence on commerce in perishable goods and nevertheless 
sustain local economies), how to replace direct political and 
business meetings with “virtual” interaction though video 
links, and how to sustain the arts and entertainment industry 
when venues cannot be reached by performers and their 
publics.
As a postscript, not all consequences of the Eyjafjallajökull 
crisis were negative. For example, a daily average of 206,465 
tonnes of CO2 was saved by the flight ban, as the 150,000 
tonnes emitted by the volcano were less than half of that pro-
duced by commercial aviation. Moreover, around London’s 
major airports air and noise pollution levels were reduced 
very significantly for the duration of the ban (Barratt and 
Fuller 2010).
9 Conclusion
Several lessons emerge from this review of the Eyjafjal-
lajökull eruption crisis. First, all national and international 
regulatory bodies need to make a more serious effort to eval-
uate the risks to civil aviation of volcanic eruptions. Scenarios 
should consider eruptive sequences that are longer and more 
catastrophic than the events of April 2010. They should con-
sider the widest possible range of consequences of any such 
emergency, and also how the various agencies involved in the 
response should act together (Figure 3). Secondly, thresholds 
for safe flying should be more rigorously defined on the basis 
of evidence-based practice and in close relation to appropriate 
meteorological and geological remote sensing. Thirdly, inter-
national coordination and regulation of European airspace 
needs to be broadened to include, not merely services, com-
petition rules and general accident prevention, but also natu-
ral hazard impacts. Fourthly, an integrated plan is needed at 
the European (i.e. pan-national) level for cases in which air 
travel needs to be substituted by other modes of transporta-
tion. These needed to be coordinated, price controls may need 
to be imposed and capacity should be increased temporarily. 
This must be achieved by prior planning. Fifthly, companies 
with significant international components need business 
continuity arrangements designed to manage situations in 
which travel and shipments by air cannot take place for some 
definable time period. Finally, simple risk aversion should not 
be a strategy in any future eruption scenario. It can lead to 
unnecessary hardship and bankruptcies and is in any case less 
efficient than management based upon proper risk assess-
ment. One needs to remember that the potential for more and 
greater volcanic ash disruption of civil aviation remains high 
and therefore this is a hazard that will not go away in the long 
term.
Note
i Several countries, notably Finland, reported engine damage to fighter 
aircraft which flew during the ash emergency. The F16 fighter engine, 
for example, operates at higher intake volume and temperature than 
commercial jet engines. The influence of volcanic ash on propeller 
aircraft is not well documented. However, it is notable that Manila 
Airport in the Philippines remained open to such craft during 
the eruption of Pinatubo in 1991 (Casadevall, Delos Reyes, and 
Schneider 1999).
Figure 3. Schematic depiction of different competencies 
and responsibilities in managing a volcanic ash emergency 
for civil aviation
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